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I. Introduction
Should the mechanical royalty for permanent digital
phonorecord deliveries ("DPDs") be set at the currently defined
statutory rate or as a percentage of the wholesale value of the
download? As music services such as iTunes, Napster, and Rhapsody
log millions in downloading sales each month, record companies are
watching the wholesale and retail values for music fall, while the
mechanical royalty rate owed to composers for a fully owned,
nonstreamed DPD remains the same as that for a physical
reproduction.1 The success of these online music services depends, in
part, on the amount and variety of music record labels are willing to
make available to consumers for download. If the mechanical royalty
rate paid to composers is disproportionate to the wholesale income
realized by record labels, those labels may decide to decrease the
availability of their online catalogs, depriving the public of an
exciting, economical, and convenient method of purchasing music.
Digital music can be accessed by either streaming or
downloading. Downloading, the focus of this note, results in a
permanent copy of a song, stored on the receiving machine's hard
drive, which can then be burned to a compact disc or transferred to
another storage medium.2 In contrast, an interactive stream is a user-
selected song played in real time. No permanent copy of the file is
made on the receiving hard drive, which requires the song to be re-
streamed for every performance.
Section 115(c)(3) of the Copyright Act recognizes the availability
of compulsory licenses for all DPDs, as well as the ability of
composers to negotiate with licensees either individually or through
common agents (called mechanical rights agents, such as the Harry
Fox Agency), but stops short of defining a statutory royalty rate, as it
has for physical reproductions.4 Section 801 of the Copyright Act
1. Telephone Interview with Ned Hearn, Esq., President, Northern California
Songwriters Association (Jan. 29, 2004); see also Benny Evangelista, Wal-Mart Wades Into
Music Battle: New Online Service To Beat Rivals' Price, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 19,2003, at B1.
2. Michael A. Einhom & Lewis Kurlantzick, Traffic Jam on the Music Highway: Is It
a Reproduction or a Performance?, J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 417, 425 (2001). These
files are often protected by "codecs," proprietary technological controls meant to prevent
piracy by allowing a file to be transferred only a certain number of times.
3. 17 U.S.C. § 1146)(7) (2000).
4. Id. § 115(c)(3). The Harry Fox Agency is a publishing rights clearing house often
used to reduce transaction costs in the issuance of mechanical licenses. See DONALD
PASSMAN, ALL You NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE Music BUSINESs 221-22 (Simon &
Schuster 4th ed. 2000).
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defines the objectives by which to establish mechanical royalties. The
potential benefits to the public and fair compensation to the copyright
holder need to be balanced against the potential impacts of the rate
on the music industry.5 These objectives were followed during the
initial fixation of the statutory rate, but recent rate courts have not
been so faithful. Instead they have used historical methods and
benchmarks that often do not correspond with each other.6 Moreover,
the Copyright Royalty Panel, the body charged with deciding the
appropriate mechanical royalty rate for a DPD, has yet to address the
matter.7 To date, Congress has simply established that the compulsory
license provision of § 115, which currently applies a mechanical
royalty rate of $0.085 per reproduction, includes phonorecords
delivered by means of a digital transmission.'
I propose that the United States adhere to international norms
by setting the mechanical royalty rate ceiling as a percentage of the
wholesale value of a DPD.9 The directives of § 801(b) should be
applied to the changing valuation of online music to fairly
compensate authors for the use of their compositions.' ° Viewing the
matter from an economic perspective, efficient licensing should
ensure that one form of delivery is not unduly burdened by copyright
administration and disproportionate royalty rates. If two technologies
are asymmetrically burdened by mechanical royalty rates, the market
will not be able to effectively determine the efficiency of each
method.' The relative decrease in wholesale income earned by a label
from a DPD, as compared to a physical reproduction, requires a
proportionate decrease in the mechanical royalty for such a
download. 2 Any other payment of mechanical royalties will create an
unprecedented burden to new models of digital delivery, which
5. 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1) (2000).
6. Einhom & Kurlantzick, supra note 2, at 420.
7. See 17 U.S.C § 115(c)(3)(D) (2000); see also R. Anthony Reese, Copyright and
Internet Music Transmissions: Existing Law, Major Controversies, Possible Solutions, 55 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 237,254 (2000).
& See 17 U.S.C. § 115(c) (2000).
9. See, e.g., Section 115 of the Copyright Act: In Need of an Update?: Hearing Before
the Subcomm on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the House Comm on the
Judiciary, 108th Cong. 37-38 (2004) [hereinafter testimony of Sherman] (testimony of Cary
Sherman, President, Recording Industry Association of America) (testifying that a similar
percentage-based mechanical rate would be ideal for "multisession" compact discs, where
several versions of the same composition are reproduced on one compact disc for extra
value to the consumer).
10. H.R. REP. No. 108-408, at 2, 10-12 (2004).
11. See Einhom & Kurlantzick, supra note 2, at 425 n.39. See generally idt at 430-34.
12. See testimony of Sherman, supra note 9, at 38.
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promise to expand the availability and sales of music, with a
corresponding boon to composers.
This comment will look into the history and policy of compulsory
mechanical royalties, explore their application in the digital world,
and apply the objectives set forth by Congress to propose a fair
mechanical rate for a permanent DPD.13 Lower wholesale prices,
despite increased efficiencies in delivery, promotion, and retailing,
suggest a proportionately lower mechanical royalty rate. The viability
of independent labels, which often release less popular and less
profitable records, requires this reassessment. Due to declining
compact disk sales and piracy, levying a disproportionate mechanical
royalty on direct phonorecord downloads in the quest to compensate
composers may deprive those same artists of a vital outlet for their
work.
II. Background of Mechanical Royalties
A. The Two Copyrights Inherent in a Recorded Song
A recorded composition gives rise to two copyrights: one in the
sound recording and one in the underlying composition embodied in
14the recording. A sound recording is defined by the Copyright Act as
the fixation of musical sounds by any method from which they can be
"perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly
or with the aid of a machine or device."' 5 As a result, one underlying
composition may be recorded several times in separate sound
recordings, each owned by a different copyright holder.
6
In contrast, the author of the composition underlying the
recording enjoys a separate set of rights, regardless of how many
times it is recorded by different artists 7 Included in these rights are
the exclusive rights to reproduce, adapt, publicly perform, and
distribute the work.18 However, the § 115 compulsory license allows
others to cover a composition under certain conditions, such as
paying a prescribed royalty to the composer. 9 This powerful
13. A discussion of the different types of DPDs defined by the Copyright Act,
including the meaning of "tethered," can be found infra Part II.E.
14. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
15. Id. § 102; see also id. § 101 (defining "sound recordings" further).
16. Id. § 102(a).
17. Id.
1& Id. § 106.
19. See id. § 115(a). A "cover" is the subsequent recording of an original composition
by an artist other than the original composer. Section 115 gives subsequent artists the right
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limitation to the composition copyright holder's exclusive rights is
meant to ensure the availability of compositions to the public, while
still giving fair compensation to the composer for his work.4
B. Balancing Compensation with Availability
In the 1909 Copyright Act, Congress granted composers the right
to control mechanical reproductions of their songs. This was done in
response to White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., in which
the Supreme Court found that copying a player piano scroll did not
constitute infringement of the exclusive reproduction right of the
underlying composition. By establishing a mechanical royalty,
Congress granted owners of the copyright in a musical work the right
to benefit from the mechanical reproduction of their work, so named
because of the mechanics involved in a player piano.22 However, this
benefit was offset by a relinquishment of exclusive control via the
compulsory license.23
Section 115 of the Copyright Act stipulates that if a nondramatic
musical composition has been fixed lawfully in a sound recording and
previously distributed under the authority of the copyright owner, it
can be covered by any interested artist.24 However, the artist must pay
either a mechanical royalty prescribed in § 115, initially capped at
$0.02 per reproduction, or a lower negotiated rate agreed to by the
composition's copyright holder.2 This compulsory license was
established to avoid possible monopolies on music publishing.26 In
1907, the actions of the Aeolian Company spurred Theodore
Roosevelt and Congress to counter what they thought to be an
unregulated monopoly2 7 Aeolian had signed exclusive agreements to
to reproduce, and distribute the composition, though the new arrangement may not
"change the basic melody or character of the work," nor may it be protected as a
"derivative work." 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2) (2000).
20. See generally id. § 801(b).
21. White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1908). It is
interesting that the same impetus that compelled the establishment of the mechanical
royalty rate--advances in music reproduction technology-are now working to make the
current mechanical royalty less equitable.
22. PASSMAN, supra note 4 at 211.
23. See 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2000).
24. Id. § 115(a)(1).
25. See id. § 115(c). In the 1909 Copyright Act, the mechanical royalty rate was
capped at $0.02. 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1909) (amended 1976).
26. Randy S. Kravis, Comment, Does a Song by Any Other Name Still Sound as
Sweet?: Digital Sampling and its Copyright Implications, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 231, 272
(1993).
27. Id.
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produce piano rolls for eighty-seven music publishers for a 10%
commission. 8 Congress felt that Aeolian, if allowed to continue this
practice, could gain the exclusive rights to the piano rolls of all music
publishers, blocking others from the business and eliminating
competition. 29 The compulsory license removes a composer's ability
to exclude others from using a work, eliminating Aeolian's ability to
monopolize the mechanical reproduction of compositions, while at
the same time compensating the composer for the use of his work.3°
However, because of the burdensome monthly payment
provisions of §115 and competition among composers, the statutory
terms are rarely followed.31 As described above, the statutory
mechanical rate represents a ceiling for voluntary negotiations
between the publisher, the composition's copyright holder, and the
licensee. A common example of this is the Controlled Composition
clause discussed below.32
C. Mechanical Royalties for Controlled Compositions
When an artist writes a composition that appears on his or her
own record, and the sound recording is owned and released by a
record company, the mechanical royalty for that composition is
usually governed by a controlled composition clause.33 In these
circumstances, the owner of the sound recording copyright, usually
the record company, negotiates a mechanical royalty to be paid to the
composer as part of an exclusive and perpetual license to reproduce
and to distribute the recording.34 However, due to superior bargaining
power and industry standards, this royalty is usually limited by both
the amount of compositions paid on the album, usually ten out of an
28. Id. It is interesting that Aeolian's "monopoly pricing" was actually less favorable
to Aeolian than the statutory rate is to composers today. At today's rate, a composer (or
publisher) earns $1.02 per record (with an average of 12 songs per record, multiplied by
the current statutory mechanical rate of $.085 per song) on a compact disc with a
wholesale value of $8.00, resulting in a 12.75% commission for the use of the work. The
statutory mechanical rate of $.085 per song became effective January 1, 2004. Todd Brabec
& Jeff Brabec, CD Mechanical Royalties for 2004 and 2005, THE AM. SOC'Y OF
COMPOSERS AND PUBLISHERS, at http://www.ascap.com/musicbiz/ascapcomer/
cornerl5.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2004).
29. JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY
430 (2002).
30. See Kravis, supra note 26, at 273.
31. See Passman, supra note 4, at 213.
32. Id. at 214.
33. Scott Hervey, Future of Online Music: Labels and Artists, 15 TRANSNAT'L LAW.
279,289 (2002).
34. Id.
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average of twelve songs on an album, and a fractional value of the
statutory mechanical royalty, typically three-fourths. 35 In addition,
many recording agreements apply a 20% deduction to the royalty in
return for free goods distributed to promote the sale of the record. 36 It
is unlikely that this many albums are actually given away. The
provision is often used as a pretext for questionable accounting, but
the practice has become industry standard. 37
These deductions do not transfer well to the downloading
industry where songs are usually purchased individually, making it
difficult to limit the amount of songs per record for which the
company must pay mechanical royalties.38 This is complicated further
by the fact that songs are easily previewed for free online, reducing
the need for free goods.39 The result is that labels selling the same
number of songs digitally earn less money, after paying the
appropriate mechanical royalties, than they would by selling those
songs in the physical world. While free goods and other standard
deductions are the result of bargaining disparities, the overall loss in
income from the cessation of the practice combined with a less
equitable mechanical royalty ratio might disrupt an already fragile
music industry, and in particular, under-funded independent labels.4°
D. Setting the Mechanical Rate for Physical Sound Recordings
Initially, the Copyright Act of 1909 established the mechanical
royalty rate at $0.02 per reproduction. 41 At first, statutory rate
increases were delayed by competing lobbying interests. Congress
realized that the issue of rate increases could not be addressed "by
the normal legislative process."42 In 1976, Congress delegated the
authority to make such rate changes to an independent Copyright
Royalty Tribunal.43 After an increase in 1976 to $0.04 per
composition, the Tribunal set a periodic schedule, which led to the
35. Wallace Collins, Confronting Controlled Composition Clauses: Pitfalls in
Mechanical Royalty Rate, 12 ENT. L. & FIN., July 1996, at 3.
36. See Passman, supra note 4, at 91-94.
37. Id.
3& Id. at 228.
39. Id. at 94.
40. See testimony of Sherman, supra note 9, at 39 (citing a 25% decline in sales of
recorded music products of the past three years, forcing labels to slash artist rosters and
support for new artists).
41. See 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1909) (amended 1976).
42. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 662 F.2d 1, 4 (D.C.
Cir. 1981).
43. Id. at 5.
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current rate of $0.085 per song up to five minutes in length, or $0.0165
per minute of playing time, whichever is higher.44
In § 801 of the Copyright Act, legislators defined the following
factors as those which should be considered by the Tribunal in
determining the mechanical rate: (1) maximizing the availability of
diverse creative works to the public; (2) affording the copyright
owner a fair income in order to encourage creative activity; (3) not
jeopardizing the ability of the copyright user to earn a fair income
under existing economic conditions and to charge the consumer a
reasonable price for the product; (4) reflecting the relative roles of
the copyright owner and the copyright user in the product made
available to the public with respect to relative creative contribution,
technological contribution, capital investment, cost, risk, and
contribution to the opening of new markets for creative expression
and media for their communication; and (5) minimizing any
disruptive impact on the structure of the industries involved and on
generally prevailing industry practices. 45
Most other countries set the mechanical royalty as a percentage
of the work's wholesale value in order to ensure that the rate
maintains its purchasing power under inflationary pressure. This
method also allows room for new means of distribution, allowing
technology to improve both consumers' experience and opportunities
for remuneration to artists and composers. The United States,
however, performs the same function by adjusting the rate
periodically, with an eye on the Consumer Price Index ("CPI"), and
ignoring economic changes brought on by huge advances in
technology.46 Despite a consistent CPI value, newer modes of digital
distribution have completely different wholesale and retail prices than
physical distribution of the same compositions. Applying the same
mechanical royalty rate unfairly punishes newer modes of music
distribution, artificially inflates costs, and fails to provide a level
playing field by which consumers and record companies can value the
new technology.4 7 Furthermore, continued reliance on the CPI to
determine the mechanical rate for a DPD ignores Congressional
objectives set forth in § 801, which seek to balance incentives to
44. See Brabec & Brabec, supra note 28.
45. See 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1)(A)-(D) (2000).
46. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am, 662 F.2d at 10 n.24, 11. It is interesting that the
same factor that compelled establishment of the mechanical royalty rate, advances in
music reproduction technology in the form of piano rolls, is now working to make the
current mechanical royalty less equitable.
47. See Einhorn & Kurlantzick, supra note 2, at 420.
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composers with the continued viability of the current music industry
structure, and to provide consumers with reasonably priced and
diverse products. 48
E. Establishing a Mechanical Royalty Rate for a Digital Phonorecord
Delivery
Digital phonorecord delivery ("DPD") is defined in the
Copyright Act as "each individual delivery of a phonorecord by the
digital transmission of a sound recording which results in a specifically
identifiable reproduction." 49 This definition purposely excludes
noninteractive, real-time streaming of a sound recording. 5° It also
excludes incidental recordings, which are created when a transmission
is temporarily stored while being distributed to a user. 51 An example
of this would be ephemeral storage on a satellite prior to transmission
to a purchaser on earth.52 A third variant of digital transmission, also
distinct from a DPD, is the tethered download.53 A tethered download
exists when a user licenses the performance rights to a sound
recording, as well as the underlying composition, only as long as she
subscribes to a given service. 4 The licensee does not own the copy, as
she will not be able to retain it past a certain period in time, and
cannot make copies of the recording for personal use.55 For example,
a tethered download will not be accessible on a hard drive after the
owner is no longer a subscriber to the music service from which the
song was downloaded.56 This comment will focus on nontethered,
nonstreamed downloads, as they share the same ownership qualities
as a physical compact disc, as opposed to interactive streaming
downloads, which are akin to an on-demand radio station.57
The Copyright Act describes a method of payment for DPD
mechanical royalties after January 1, 1998 as based on voluntary
48. See 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1) (2000).
49. Id. § 115(d).
50. Id. ("A [DPD] does not result from a real-time, non-interactive subscription
transmission of a sound recording where no reproduction of the sound recording or
musical work embodied therein is made.., to make the sound recording audible.").
51. JOHN W. HAZARD, JR., 1 COPYRIGHT LAW IN BUSINESS AND PRACTICE § 4:52
(rev. ed. 2003).
52. Id.
53. P2pnet, Pressplay / MusicNet 'aren't threats,' at http://www.p2pnet.net/story/484
(Jan. 5, 2004).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See id.
57. See 17 U.S.C. § 1140)(7) (2000).
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negotiations between the copyright owner and anyone entitled to
obtain a compulsory license.- In the absence of a negotiated
agreement, a binding compulsory rate will be set by a Copyright
Arbitration Royalty Panel (CARP).59 Recently, a proposal has been
made to replace the CARP with a set of three Copyright Royalty
Judges, who would be more familiar with the subject matter at hand.
60
Regardless of the determining body, rates are to be established de
novo, with no precedential effect given to the mechanical rate for
non-digital delivery.61 The objectives are the same as those given by
Congress to the initial Copyright Royalty Tribunal codified in § 801
of the Copyright Act.6
F. Downloading Services
Apple's iTunes music service sold its one hundred millionth song
in July of 2004. That song, ironically, was a remix by the copyright-
flaunting producer, DJ Danger Mouse.63 Rhapsody listeners pay for
over 28 million streams a month and Jupiter Research foresees a $3
billion online music industry by 2008.64 These new music services
represent a monumental change in the course of legal downloading
on the internet.6 Dozens of companies, as disparate as Starbucks and
Walmart, now feature music downloading services which are
expected to represent over 33% of all music sales within 4 years.66
They aggregate content directly and through independent distributors
from all of the major labels and many of the independent labels,
5& Id. § 115(c)(3)(A)(ii), (B) ("[A]ny copyright owners of nondramatic musical
works... may negotiate and agree upon the terms and rates of royalty payments under
this paragraph....").
59. Id. § 115(c)(3)(D).
60. H.R. REP. No. 108-408, at 1, 4 (2004).
61. See generally id at 5-8.
62. 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1) (2000).
63. The iTunes Music Store Countdown to 100 Million SongsApple Computer, at
http://www.apple.com/itunes/100milion (last visited Sept. 29, 2004). DJ Danger Mouse
drew the Beatles and record company ire when he mixed together portions of the Beatles'
White Album with Jay-Z's Black Album to form his Grey Album. See Barry A. Jeckell
ed., Billboard Bits: Handy Awards, Snoop Dogg, Danger Mouse/Zero 7, Daily Music
News, at http://www.billboard.com/bb/daily/article-display.jsp?vnu-contentid=
1000469071 (Mar. 22, 2004).
64. Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, Online Music's Winners and
Losers, CNET News.com, at http://news.com.com/2030-1027-5133561.html?tag=cd-top
(Dec. 27,2003).
65. Peter S. Menell, Envisioning Copyright Law's Digital Future, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REv. 63, 120-21 (2003).
66. Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, supra note 64.
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selling songs from $0.79 to $0.99 a download, and $9.99 per album.6
The attraction to these services is the promise of a celestial jukebox:
legal, virus-free, affordable music at one's beck and call.6 Recent
statements by Apple CEO, Steve Jobs, indicate that a primary goal of
Apple's iTunes Service is to find lesser known, more obscure titles by
artists whose works are out of print, or who do not command the
attention through high sales volumes as their more mainstream
colleagues.69 This puts special emphasis on digital distribution for such
composers and artists. If the mechanical royalty rate for a DPD is not
cost effective for labels to make these more obscure recordings
available online, independent and less popular composers and artists
will feel the greatest impact.
Similarly, consumers face what seems to be a never-ending rise in
the retail price of a compact disk. Via online music stores, consumers
are able to download full albums for almost half the price of a retail
compact disk. Disproportionately high mechanical royalties will hurt
consumers and their ability to access inexpensive and diverse music.7°
Furthermore, as the market grows, consumer demand will
continue to define the retail price of a DPD. Real Networks'
Rhapsody service has set their download retail price at $0.99 and has
recently promoted a half-price sale to increase listenership 1 In fact,
Downloadpunk.com has set its wholesale rate as a percentage of the
retail price of a song, which itself is chosen by the label. While this
gives the label wide latitude to establish its wholesale income, the
current static mechanical royalty rate punishes labels who hope to
drive sales with affordable downloads. Clearly, competition will
continue to alter the valuations of DPDs and reliance on a static
statutory rate will prove inequitable.2 The result of a static
67. Johnnie L. Roberts, Pay 2 Play, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 13, 2003, at 47.
68. Id. at48.
69. See Derek of CD Baby, CD Baby Reports on iTunes Meeting Re: Indy Music,
Gnutella News, at http://www.gnutellanews.com/article/6830 (June 6, 2003) (reporting
Steve Jobs', CEO, Apple Computer, Inc., address to independent labels at Apple
company headquarters in Cupertino, California).
70. See Roberts, supra note 67, at 48.
71. Telephone Interview with Kevin Arnold, CEO and Founder, Independent Online
Distribution Alliance (June 2, 2003) [hereinafter Arnold]; Jefferson Graham, Real Says
Digital Song Sale Doubled Market Share, USA TODAY, Sept. 8, 2004, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/technology/2004-09-08-realx.htm (updated
Sept. 9, 2004).
72. SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, REGULATORY LAW AND POLICY:
CASES AND MATERIALS 24 (LEXIS Law Publishing 2d ed. 1998). If services are forced to
raise prices to remain profitable, these inequities could eventually be weighted toward
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mechanical rate will be that a label's profit margin from the sale on a
DPD will vary from one service to another. This arrangement would
provide the composer with a steady stream of income that is not
consistent with the amount actually received by the label. A solution
to this would entail setting the mechanical rate as a percentage of the
wholesale income of a label, ensuring equal footing to both the label
and the artist. This would provide a fair return for musicians and
record labels alike, regardless of the retail or wholesale price of the
download, which will likely vary as the market determines the
appropriate value of DPDs.
One danger of the percentage model is that a record label may
decide to sell a recorded song at a low value so as to cause the
composer's set percentage-share to be far below the current statutory
value, as is possible via the Downloadpunk.com model described
above. Perhaps, the solution to this is to establish a floor for the
mechanical royalty, as opposed to the current ceiling. This would
allow the composer to earn an established percentage of the
composition's wholesale value, while protecting him from below cost
sell-offs or other discount, mid-priced or budget liquidations. The
choice then would be up to the label, rather than copyright law, as to
whether it wants to pay a disproportionate amount of the recorded
composition's wholesale value to the composer.
At the very least, sales in the digital medium will represent a
significant portion of music purchased worldwide.73 Major and
independent labels from across the globe are supplying content to
dozens of services, either directly or through more efficient
aggregators such as the Independent Online Distribution Alliance or
CDBaby's digital distribution arm.74 Clearly, a fair mechanical royalty
rate for DPDs must be established which promotes science, thus
giving the public access to recorded content by fairly compensating
composers, while continuing the existence of the independent labels
upon which they depend.75
record labels. A percentage-based mechanical royalty could easily work in artists' favor in
the future.
73. See Menell, supra note 65, at 66.
74. Matthew S. Robinson, Smoothing the Way For Indies Online: Middlemen Link
Labels, Digital Retailers, BILLBOARD MAG., Oct. 25, 2003, at 51-52.
75. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (referring to "science" as that which is protected by
copyrights, as opposed to the "useful arts" which is protected by the patent system); see
also 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1) (2000) (discussing the need to consider impacts to the music
industry while setting the statutory mechanical royalty rate).
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HI. Applying Copyright Act Section 801 to
the Digital Music Industry
For the purposes of establishing a fair mechanical royalty, the
sale of a digital download entails different parameters than that of a
physical reproduction. The wholesale value of a DPD is significantly
lower than the top-shelf, or undiscounted, wholesale price of a single
song sold via physical distribution.7 6 This suggests that fair
compensation to the songwriter would entail defining the mechanical
royalty rate for a DPD as a percentage of the wholesale value earned
by the record label, rather than applying the current mechanical
royalty rate of $0.085 per reproduction. 77 In the next section, the
statutory language of § 801 will be applied to the realities of digital
downloading to assess whether the current statutory rate or a
percentage-based model treats composers and record companies
more fairly. During the assessment, the Congressional goal of
promoting creative output for the benefit of the public will also be
considered.
A. Maximizing the Availability of Diverse Creative Works to the Public
It is well documented that copyright protection provides an
incentive to create, without which the public would lose a valuable
benefit.78 It stands to reason that the more an artist is paid for a work,
the larger the incentive, and perhaps opportunity, he has to create the
work.79 Although it is easy to dismiss art as an aesthetic and
recreational pastime, the cost and time spent writing and recording
compositions is significant, and this investment would clearly be
facilitated by an increase in the value of those compositions. If the
mechanical rate were to be raised or lowered, it would likely affect
the availability of diverse creative works to the public."
However, the importance of independent labels to the diversity
of available music should also be considered. When analyzing the
impact on artists and record labels due to sales of direct downloads, it
is helpful to use independent labels as a model because they rarely
76. Telephone Interview with David Katznelson, Owner and President, Birdman
Recording Group (Mar. 10, 2004) [hereinafter Katznelson].
77. See Brabec & Brabec, supra note 28.
78. Loren J. Weber, Something in the Way She Moves. The Case for Applying
Copyright Protection to Sports Moves, 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 317,334 (2000).
79. Id.
80. See 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1)(A).
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own their own distribution companies, which is a large factor in the
wholesale value of a record.8'
Major labels are often owned by parent corporations with
subsidiary distribution companies.8 This reduces distribution costs for
both physical product and DPD sales, a luxury not available to
independent labels. However, to support these vast infrastructures
and maximize profits, major labels focus on only the most profitable
releases.83 It is the smaller, more experimental labels that provide the
most diversity to the public, and for this reason, must be protected
from overly burdensome royalty rates.8 Without a mechanical royalty
that considers independent labels' thin margins, artists will have fewer
avenues to promote and distribute their work, and the public will
suffer as a result.8
B. Affording the Copyright Owner a Fair Income in Order to Encourage
Creative Activity
Under the current mechanical rate for compact discs, a composer
will earn $0.085 per composition physically sold on a compact disc,
phonograph record, tape recording, or any other physical
embodiment of a composition, ignoring controlled compositions
clauses.86 Assuming an independent recording company receives $0.67
as wholesale income per composition on a physical record and
assuming there are twelve compositions paid on a record with a
wholesale value of $8.00, the songwriter would realize a 12.7% share
of the wholesale price of the recording. In contrast, an $0.085
mechanical rate would represent a 15.5% share of an independent
label's $0.55 wholesale income per DPD.87
Typically, digital music services sell downloads to consumers for
$0.99, while they pay distributors $0.65 for the right to do so.
Distributors retain 15%, less than most physical distribution rates of
81. See Telephone Interview with Nick Tangborn, Owner, Jackpine Social Club
Records (Feb. 23, 2004) [hereinafter Tangborn]; Telephone Interview with Jon DeLange,
Owner, Tinderbox Music/No Alternative Records (Oct. 7,2004) [hereinafter DeLange].
82 See DeLange, supra note 81.
83. See Tangborn, supra note 81.
84. Telephone Interview with Jordan Kurland, Owner and President, Zeitgeist Artist
Management and Seventeen Reasons Recording Co., a subsidiary of the Universal Music
Group (Jan. 19,2004).
85. Id.
86. See Brabec & Brabec, supra note 28.
87. See Arnold, supra note 71. The $0.55 wholesale rate factors in a 15% commission
for digital distribution, which involves encoding, data entry, digital delivery, reporting,
accounting, and blanket license negotiation.
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20-25%, while paying $0.55 wholesale to the record label."' Since the
label's wholesale income is 16.7% less for a DPD than for the
physical sale of an album, affording the copyright owner a fair income
would require lowering the mechanical royalty rate by 16.7% to $0.07
per composition directly downloaded. This way, the composer is
earning 12.7% of the wholesale value of a song, regardless of whether
it is downloaded or sold as a physical record.
This analysis ignores the controlled composition clauses inherent
in most independent and major label recording agreements. However,
labels can still attempt to negotiate similar terms, perhaps by only
paying mechanical royalties on ten of every twelve compositions
purchased as a DPD. Percentage deductions could also be applied, as
the $0.07 rate would be a default ceiling, similar to the current
compulsory rate for physical records. The dubious free goods
deductions would be more difficult to justify, but labels will likely find
ways to charge artists for any physical recording or co-op advertising
done in conjunction with downloading services. 89 Setting the
mechanical royalty rate of a DPD as a percentage of the wholesale
value rewards artists and supports avenues for their creativity,
independent labels, while leaving the current economic balance
between labels and artists unaffected.
C. Avoid Jeopardizing the Ability of the Copyright User to Earn a Fair
Income Under Existing Economic Conditions and Charge the
Consumer a Reasonable Price for the Product
Previous increases in the mechanical rate were justified by
increases in the cost of living, increases in wholesale prices of
recordings, and other economic factors.90 Clearly, there is no
difference in the cost of living between the two mediums of
distribution because the composer is being compensated for both the
direct digital and the hard copy reproductions at the same point in
88 Id.
89. A co-op advertisement is a retail store advertisement done in bulk, whose
expense is shared by several artists on a label or several labels serviced by the same
distributor (who passes the cost on to the labels). Andrew C. Selden, An Analysis of
Cooperative Buying Associations-Including New Concerns for Franchise Systems, 37 Bus.
LAW. 1569 (1982). It is the policy of every major downloading service to refuse co-op
advertising, or payment for artist placement. See, e.g., Derek of CD Baby, supra note 69.
However, marketing and profit pressures make this an open question in the future.
90. Copyright Royalty Tribunal Explains Reasons for Increase in Compulsory License
Record Royalty, 2 ENT. L. REP. No. 23, May 1, 1981, at 4 (citing 46 Fed. Reg. 10,466 (Feb.
3, 1981) (codified at 37 C.F.R. § 307)); 60 Fed. Reg. 55,458, 55,459 (Nov. 1, 1995) (codified
at 37 C.F.R. § 255).
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time, depending only upon whether the composition is sold through
an online music service or a brick and mortar retailer. In addition,
since the same recording is simply being sold digitally either over the
internet or in the form of a compact disc, the cost of producing the
sound recording itself remains constant. Therefore, this prong of the
analysis is less relevant to the discussion of comparable equity, as
nothing has changed due to the different medium of delivery. More
pertinent, however, will be the economic benefits realized by record
companies and the allocation of those benefits to songwriters.
Retail DPDs sell for $0.99 each on most services, with some
selling for as little as $0.79. 9' Compare these DPD prices to an average
retail price of $1.41 per track for a compact disc, assuming a $16.99
retail price.9' Clearly, the lower price of a DPD is a benefit to the
consumer representing a turnaround in the rising price of music. 93 In
fact, the ability to buy downloads as singles, rather than full albums, is
one of the downloading services' main appeals. 4 Instead of having to
find a record store that carries obscure works and to purchase a full
record, a buyer can download individually chosen singles from
services with unprecedented variety.9' This affordable choice benefits
artists, composers, labels, and consumers because it is likely to result
in more music purchased overall.9
If the mechanical rate is set too high, many labels, especially
independents, may choose not to make their music available online
because of the smaller margins that result from paying composers the
inflexible statutory fee. 97 Though more sales may result, if a company
loses money on each sale, the successful introduction of digital
downloading as a viable retail alternative to consumers will not be
profitable, and labels will opt not to participate9 If the intent of the
Copyright Act is to be followed, the royalty rate should provide an
incentive to create for the benefit of the public.99 Failure to correlate
91. See Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, supra note 64.
92. See Katznelson, supra note 76.
93. See Arnold, supra note 71.
94. See Katznelson, supra note 76.
95. Alex Veiga, Tough Tactics Give Music Industry New Sales Hope, Information
Week, available at http://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articlelD=
17300407 (Jan. 12, 2004).
96. This is based on the economic assumption that in a competitive market, demand
grows as price decreases. See Shapiro & Tomain, supra note 72, at 25.
97. See id.
9& See generally Section 115 of the Copyright Act: In Need of an Update?, supra note
9, at 41.
99. See 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1) (2000).
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the mechanical royalty rate of a DPD to the wholesale value of a
composition may quash a burgeoning market, which is both cheaper
and more diverse than what consumers currently experience in the
physical world.10
D. Reflect the Relative Roles of the Copyright Owner and the User With
Respect to Relative Creative Contribution, Technological Contribution,
Capital Investment, Cost, Risk, and Contribution to the Opening of
New Markets for Creative Expression and Media for Public
Communication
There are many changes in the costs and risks inherent to digital
as opposed to physical distribution. Not only does a phonograph
record, compact disc, or cassette actually have to be manufactured,
but it has to be shipped, promoted, sold, and then potentially
returned.01 The same issues do not exist for the sale of a DPD. There
are no packaging or shipping costs, promotion can be done as easily
as a website link, transactions are seamless and efficient, and there is
no need for reserves to account for potential customer returns.12
The following sections detail the efficiencies of digital music that
somewhat counter the smaller margins realized by labels for the sale
of a DPD.
1. Manufacturing and Shipping Costs
As technology has matured costs of manufacturing and
packaging compact discs has dropped dramatically. The average cost
of manufacturing and printing is approximately $0.48 per compact
disc. Costs may be even lower when done in bulk by a major label. 1
Regardless of historically low manufacturing costs, these costs quickly
add up on very large production runs of compact discs and comprise
6% of every wholesale unit and erode profit margins.' ° These costs
make the distribution of less popular artists cost prohibitive because a
significant investment is required for even the most limited release,
especially when shipping charges to the thousands of disparate major
and independent retail music outlets across the country are
100. See generally id.
101. See Passman, supra note 4, at 81.
102. "Reserves" are a percentage of records sold for which royalties are contractually
withheld from the artist for a certain amount of time by a record label to account for
potential returns. See Passman, supra note 4, at 96.
103. See Tangborn, supra note 81.
104. Assuming a wholesale price of $8.00. See id. (establishing the wholesale price of a
record to be $7.00-$9.00).
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considered. The problem is compounded even further in the case of
worldwide releases. Due to the cost of manufacturing and shipping
compact discs for availability across the world, only select artists are
released worldwide, usually in collaboration with a foreign
distributor, resulting in fewer opportunities for independent artists
and composers. If the product of less well-known artists is not
available in a given city or country, these artists will be less likely to
tour, therefore earning less money, and reducing the exposure of the
artist in that part of the world.
Manufacturing and shipping costs are negligible in the sale of a
digital download.1a Digital music data is transmitted either via the
internet or physically within hard drives containing tens of thousands
of tracks.'0 There are certain costs in encoding a sound recording;
moreover, they are one-time expenses."" Record companies keep
much more of the wholesale price of their products due to the
seamless delivery of encoded content, usually by a distributor or
third-party services such as Loudeye.i8 These savings could be
considered as a potential offset to the less favorable mechanical
royalty ratio that would be experienced by a label if the mechanical
rate were to remain the same.1° In addition, the worldwide
availability of content allows the artist or composer freedom to
appear in numerous countries without restrictions due to poor
product distribution. Not only will consumers be able to purchase a
composer's music from any computer worldwide, but they will also
have access to a composer or artist's entire repertoire, rather than to
only the titles the record company or distributor finds to be the most
profitable or popular.
Complicating this efficiency for record labels is the lack of a
standard recording contract term. However, many record labels
contractually include a 20% packaging deduction to standard
recording agreements. This serves to pass the costs of packaging, but
not manufacturing, to the artist, though the actual cost of packaging
can hardly be as high as $3.40.11° Though the inapplicability of this
clause to the sale of a DPD may result in a more equitable scenario
for artists, it will remove a windfall labels have enjoyed for years and
105. See generally Robert F. Easley et al., The MP3 Open Standard and the Music
Industry's Response to Internet Piracy, COMM. OF THE ACM, Nov. 2003, at 90, 92.
106. See Arnold, supra note 71.
107. Id.
10 Id.
109. See generally Easley et al., supra note 105.
110. 20% of a hypothetical (though common) retail price of $16.99.
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further reduce the profit margin in the sale of a DPD. As economic
theory suggests, if the marginal costs of a sale are not recouped by a
label, it may cease to make recordings available online, thus
eliminating a cheap, diverse alternative for consumers, and a lucrative
means of income for composers and artists."' While charging artists
inflated packaging costs should not be defended, any overall
reduction in label margins may significantly impact their ability to
survive, especially those not benefited by large economies of scale.
2. Distribution Fees
Once a compact disc is manufactured, it must be distributed to
retail outlets worldwide, usually by entities owned by the parent
company of the record label, or by independent distributors who
112retain a commission or fee for the service. For purposes of this
analysis, an independent distribution service will be used as an
example. Individual distribution services are generally not owned by
the labels they distribute; therefore, there are no economies of scale
to distort the real costs of distribution."' However, independent
distributors operate within the same price structures as major
distribution companies when selling their content to physical record
stores, which allows for an accurate comparison of wholesale and
retail prices across independent and major labels."4
Independent physical distribution company agreements,
although they vary, often stipulate the purchase of compact discs
from record companies for $8.00 each."5 The distribution company
then sells the compact discs to retail stores for up to $10.00 each, an
18-20% mark-up, and the retail stores often sell a compact disc to the
consumer for $15.99-18.99."6 In comparison, independent digital
distributors, such as the Independent Online Distribution Alliance,
retain only 15 % of the wholesale price paid to a label, as compared to
the 20-40% retained by a physical distributor. 7 If a song sells for
$0.99 through an online music service, it will pay the digital
distributor $0.65. The distributor retains 15% of the wholesale price,
111. See Shapiro & Tomain, supra note 72, at 25.
112. Ed Christman, Caparro Eyes Warner Music Group for EDC Dream, BILLBOARD
MAG., Apr. 19, 2003, at 5.
113. See id.; Elliot Goldman, Indies Have More Chance to Shine, BILLBOARD MAG.,
June 26, 1993, at 6.
114. See generally Section 115 of the Copyright Act: In Need of an Update?, supra note
9, at 38.
115. See Tangbom, supra note 81.
116. See Passman, supra note 4, at 203.
117. See Arnold, supra note 71.
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and pays $0.55 to the record company." 8 At first glance, this lower
distribution fee should allow the label to profit more from a DPD
than it would from the sale of a physical recording and help to excuse
inequities in the mechanical rate.
Even though independent digital distribution is more
economical, the lower retail valuation of $0.99 for a DPD drops the
wholesale value as well, while the companies' over-head remain
constant.19 Despite efficiencies, the record company still realizes a
lower wholesale price for a downloaded composition than it does for
a physical sale of the same song.'2 If not made a percentage of this
wholesale rate, the mechanical royalty will represent a greater
percentage of the wholesale value of a DPD than it does for the sale
of a composition on a physical product, therefore decreasing the
incentive for record labels to make their catalogs available for sale
online.21 This disincentive would hurt both composers and consumers
by decreasing diversity and creating higher music prices.
3. Promotional Costs
Every shipment of product through a distributor to a hard copy
retail store must include a certain amount of free goods or
promotional records, posters, etc. from the record company in order
to drive sales of records.122 Free goods sometimes represent 5% to
10% of the amount of records shipped to the store.'2 These items cost
money to manufacture, ship, and distribute and sometimes entail the
use of street teams or promotional companies hired to promote a
record on behalf of the label. 124 Many times street teams are
comprised of active fans of the artist, while other times independent
promoters are hired to put up posters or flyers at concert venues
advertising an album or release.
118, Id.
119. Assuming a retail value of $1.49 per song on a physical, 12-song compact disc
retailing for $17.99.
120. A record company realizes $0.66 per song physically reproduced (after
distribution costs) as compared to $0.55 received for the sale of a distributed DPD. These
monetary values are derived by dividing an average wholesale price of a physical record
($8.00) by an average number of songs on a record (12) to come up with $0.66. See
Tangborn, supra note 81 (establishing the wholesale price of a record to be $7.00-$9.00);
Arnold, supra note 71 (establishing the wholesale value of a distributed DPD to be $0.55).
121. See testimony of Sherman, supra note 9, at 38-40.
122 See id.
123. See Passman, supra note 4, at 94.
124. Lisa Scherzer, That Buzz You're Hearing May Be from Street Team Marketers,
N.Y. SUN, Mar. 25, 2004, at 14.
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Digital phonorecord delivery eliminates many of these costs.
Instead of promotional compact discs, most online music services
provide consumers free thirty-second clips of songs to sample before
purchase.1'2 Printed materials do not factor as heavily in the
promotion of music sales online either, since information posted on a
webpage involves little raw material. The result of these promotional
efficiencies is that record companies do not have to expend the same
amount of resources to promote a digital download as they do for a
hard copy sale. 26
Although these efficiencies benefit labels charged with
promoting albums, artists and composers share in the benefits as well.
Standard record deals often require artists to recoup at least half of
the costs of independent promotion involved in the marketing of their
products1 2 Independent promotion is defined as any marketing
performed by persons outside of the record company. An example of
independent promotion is the marketing performed by the street
teams and promotional crews referred to above.' 28 Lower costs will
mean less money for artists to recoup before they can realize profits
from sales. Most independent and major label records feature artists
who also write the songs on their records; therefore, the marketing
efficiencies benefit both composers and labels, and should not be
factored in when determining the equity of continuing to apply the
statutory rate of $0.085 for a DPD.
Another consideration is that real world marketing will not cease
due to digital distribution. Consumers will still need to be drawn to
artist web pages on the music services, and although the web offers
many opportunities for cheap marketing, record companies will still
need to invest a fair amount of money to break an artist, whether it is
for print ads, radio advertising, posters and billboards, or co-op
advertising on the music services.' 29 This indicates that promotional
savings due to digital distribution will not be a panacea for the
escalating promotional costs seen today. This is another reason why
125. See, e.g., The #1 Music Download Store, Apple.com, at
http://www.apple.com/itunes/store/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2004) (stating that the free thirty-
second samples are accessed by double-clicking on a desired track in this virtual store).
126. See, e.g., id
127. See Passman, supra note 4, at 108. The term "recoup" refers to the repayment of
any monetary advances or recording costs paid by the label to or on behalf of the artist.
Generally artists recoup debts at their "all-in" royalty rate, commonly 12-15% of the retail
price of a record sold, subject to various deductions such as the "free goods" deductions
discussed above. Id
128. See Scherzer, supra note 124.
129. See DeLange, supra note 81.
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marketing savings due to online promotions is not dispositive when
considering the fairness of the current statutory rate applied to DPDs.
E. To Minimize Any Disruptive Impact on the Structure of the Industries
Involved and on Generally Prevailing Industry Practices
Independent labels make up a growing percentage of total record
sales worldwide.1" They are a valuable alternative to major labels,
which, because of their size and marketing expenditures, require
releases to appeal to the least common denominator in order to
recoup the money invested in the release. 31 These independent labels
lack size, capital, major media marketing power, radio access, and the
efficiencies of having in-house distribution and manufacturing, and
often have razor thin margins.' 32 In addition, independent labels lack
the political lobbying power of the Recording Industry Association of
America ("RIAA") and other music industry groups. Similar to the
plight of artists who are not adequately represented to lawmakers,
independent and corporate interests are not always the same.
A drop in the wholesale value of their releases could even
further reduce the viability of independent labels. Contrary to
Congressional intent codified in Copyright Act § 801, applying the
current statutory rate to a DPD would likely cause a disruptive
impact to the independent record industry. 33 Already hampered by
piracy and file sharing, independent labels cannot afford to have their
margins diminished any further.14 Assigning the mechanical royalty
rate as a percentage of the lowered wholesale value of a download
would most fairly maintain regular industry practices and would fairly
compensate both composers and record labels so that both may
survive and benefit the public. A failure to do so might reduce the
landscape of creative output to only those artists who reach a
threshold of popularity. Even worse, the current legal download
industry might suffer due to reduced label profits and the resulting
reluctance to make music available online.
130. See Goldman, supra note 113.
131. See Passman, supra note 4, at 111.
132. See id.
133. See 17. U.S.C. § 801(b)(1)(D) (2000).
134. See Paul Verna, Record Label Remedy, Mix MAG., May 1, 2003, at 6.
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IV. Conclusion
Overall, it is clear that Congressional intent requires a lower
mechanical royalty rate for DPDs than that for compact discs.'35
While digital technology provides much efficiency in the promotion
and manufacture of materials, the market wholesale rate is 16.7%
lower for a DPD than for a physical compact disc.' 36 To be fair to
composers and continue to reward them at a similar rate, the
statutory ceiling should reflect the lower wholesale value of a DPD as
compared to that of a physical product.37 If different modes of
distribution require disproportionate payouts to composers via the
mechanical royalty, consumers and record companies will not be able
to fairly evaluate the value of the distribution method. In addition,
the difficult business environment experienced by less well-funded
independent labels requires that the application of the mechanical
rate to new media be tailored to support their existence. If the
mechanical rate is not set as a percentage of the wholesale value of a
DPD, labels will likely consolidate further, or choose not to sell
content online, therefore restricting the availability of music to the
public that is low-cost and highly diverse.
This comment is not meant to discount compensation for
composers, nor is it meant to vindicate corporate label interests.
Instead, its intent is to strike a balance between the interests of
authors and the ability of independent labels to flourish and continue
to provide an outlet for diverse creative minds. Even for major labels,
tightening margins will result in risk-taking in signings and less
investment in new artists, leading to a decrease in diversity.'18
Advances in technology, which hold huge potential benefits for
composers, record labels and consumers, should not be punished by
disproportionate mechanical royalties. In addition to restricting the
availability of such works to the public, contrary to the Congressional
intent of § 115, this would disadvantage the very composers that the
mechanical royalty was meant to protect. These are real concerns,
and while artists, composers, consumers, and labels will experience
benefits with the availability of paid DPDs, we must balance all
interests in establishing a fair mechanical rate.
135. See 17 U.S.C. § 801 (2000).
136. 16.7% is the percent change of the DPD wholesale rate of $0.55 and the
wholesale rate of a physical song of $0.66. See Arnold, supra note 71 (establishing a DPD
wholesale rate of $0.55); and see supra note 120 and accompanying text.
137. See 17 U.S.C. § 801.
13& See, e.g., testimony of Sherman, supra note 9, at 39.
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